Introduction
If there is an area of European, and even global, 1 sport that has been affected by the application of EU law is that of governance. This has been a rather long, protracted and indirect process, though. One will not find the EU directly regulating sport as it has done in other markets, such as the audio-visual industry or the air travel industry. Certainly, there is not a European directive on the governance of sport; but the commutative effect of EU policies, Court judgments, Commission competition policy decisions and, lastly, the nascent EU sport policy under Article 165 TFEU have contributed to the transformation of European sport governance. So for example Walrave, 2 the first sport-related ruling of the European Courts, was in essence a governance conflict. The case, let us remind, was about two sportspersons that were challenging the rules adopted by the International Cycling Union (UCI). In other words, there was a conflict about the power to regulate access to competitions between the governing body and the athletes. That, in essence, is what governance is about:
Having robust, reliable and accountable processes by which an organisation takes decisions.
As Tricker excellently put it, "management is about running an organisation, good governance is about ensuring and demonstrating that it is properly run". 3 What the ECJ did in Walrave 4 and two decades after in Bosman 5 was just to ensure that the governing bodies respected the basic rights of the athletes and, in doing so, it reminded those federations the need to take into account the rights and opinions of their most fundamental stakeholders. The term governance does not appear much in Court rulings or Commission decisions, though. It is actually much easier to find it in policy documents. In order to understand the reciprocal importance of governance and EU sports law, it is necessary to note a number of key points that are paramount for the correct understanding of this chapter.
First, it is essential to underline that the impact of EU sports law on governance is the aggregated result of the indirect (and to some extent also unforeseen) consequences of a large list of decisions and rulings in single cases. So, for example, Bosman 6 fundamentally transformed the balance of power in the relationship between players, clubs and governing bodies.
Second, it is important to understand that much of the EU decisions in the area of sport governance are as much political as they are legal. Whereas this chapter contributes to a research handbook of law, it will invariably refer to policy and politics as well. Sport governance, at its very core, deals with the distribution of power and authority in sport, and that is a profoundly political reality as much as it may also be a legal debate. Thus, after years of court judgments and other decisions, the Council of the European Union incorporated in 2011 governance as one of the priority areas within the Work Plan for Sport 7 that gave strategic direction to the nascent EU Sport Policy.
Third, for the sake of clarity and to facilitate analysis, this chapter makes a conscious choice to stay at a general level to explain EU sports law's relevance to shaping European sport political governance and good governance. 9 The first one refers to the structures that facilitate power and authority relations of stakeholders within the sports system. The latter refers to the normative principles that should define those relationships within the management of sport organisations. Political governance, for these authors, refers to the specific role of the state and public authorities in regulating sport and their relationship with sport non-governmental organisations. It is, however, possible to subsume political governance as one specific element of the wider systemic governance, which would then reduce the conceptual dimensions to just two useful heuristic devices to build our analysis upon.
Thus, this chapter refers to (1) governance as a systemic structure that makes sense of the relationships among a large number of stakeholders; 10 and (2) governance as 'good governance', which is defined as involving the principles of effective, transparent and democratic management. 11 As Holt points out these definitions of governance can be seen as both analytical (or descriptive) and normative. 12 Applied to sport, this means that we can use the concept of governance to analyse how sport is governed systemically and to comment on how well it is or should be governed.
Therefore, in this chapter we will first explore the relevance of EU sports law for the systemic governance of European sport in order to continue, afterwards, analysing the normative vision that EU sports law and policy on how European sport should be governed through the principles of good governance. Before getting to that, this section needs to finish with a deeper look to the definition and implication of these two dimensions of governance.
Systemic governance
Systemic governance is an analytical concept. This definition of governance refers to the management of a structure with a large number of stakeholders where power, authority and resources are diffused and distributed across the system. 13 In the area of sport, Chaker continent, whose impact on sport cannot be overestimated, for it created numerous frictions amongst those who wanted to benefit from the booming TV and marketing contracts. This section explains the role that European sports law and policy have had in shaping the evolving nature of that elusive European Model of Sport. The section covers three main points. First, a reflection on the rulings and decisions that have shaped the balance of power amongst stakeholders, with special focus on the governing bodies. Second, a particular reference to the social dialogue, as an alternative forum outside traditional sport governance structures. Finally, the section looks at the structured dialogue, as a platform of cooperation between EU institutions and sport organisations.
-From pyramids to networks
When European law first entered the territory of sport in 1974, it was a major surprise for many of those in the industry. Even when the ECJ ruled in Bosman, it was also unexpected for those in the governing bodies of the sport. This is perhaps best explained by the organisational autonomy that the sporting movement had historically enjoyed. Sport has been mostly a self-regulating industry, which has perceived any external regulation as unnecessary, unless it is related to funding. The traditional pyramidal structure of sport governance put governing bodies firmly at the top, whereas athletes were relegated mostly to the bottom of the structure, without a major say in strategic decisions. However, this has been slowly overturned by the application of EU sports law over the years.
The Bosman judgment of 1995 was the first major blow for sport stablished powers, for it allowed team sport players to break free from the tight control of transfer regulations and nationality quotas; this was then further extended in Kolpak 21 to nationals of countries with an association agreement containing non-discrimination clauses. In Bosman, the Belgian footballer had to bring the governing bodies to court, as European law was the only tool institutions and sport organisations). These are processes that rely on negotiation and dialogue, therefore need to be seen as more political than going to court.
The social dialogue
The European social dialogue is considered by the Commission as 'a unique and Whereas the social dialogue brings together sport stakeholders, the so-called structured dialogue provides an opportunity for sport organisations to enter into dialogue with EU institutions involved in the design of EU sport policy. This is, again, a political avenue whose objective is to inform EU policy-making. It is of interest because it provides an opportunity to analyse the extent to which sport organisations have conditioned EU decisions in this area. It is also relevant because it is one of the pillars of the now formal EU sport policy under Article 165 TFEU.
-Structured dialogue
One of the few explicit goals stated in Article 165 TFEU is to promote "cooperation between bodies responsible for sports" (TFEU 165:2), hence carrying the implication that the EU should engage with the sports movement going forward when developing this new policy area. In essence, structured dialogue refers to a mechanism of bi-annual meetings between the EU institutions and sporting stakeholders. Belgian Presidency. Thus, structured dialogue meetings would be ad-hoc in nature, with topics chosen and stakeholders invited at the discretion of the incumbent Council Presidency.
In practice, structured dialogue refers to a one hour 'working lunch' held before the convening of the last ministerial Council meeting in Brussels of a Presidency term. 45 The
Council of the European Union is represented by the so-called 'trio Presidency', and accompanied by a member of the incoming trio. The EU is also represented by the Commissioner responsible for sport; the Council Secretariat; and occasionally a member of the European Parliament. The lunch directly precedes the convening of the formal Council meeting which, after formal procedures, is followed by a policy debate between ministers, generally on the same topic that has been discussed during the structured dialogue meeting.
Sport Stakeholders are invited according to the topic of the day. Topics are generally, if not exclusively, linked to issues on the Council formal agenda. Thus, structured dialogue has been implemented in two main ways. First, as an opportunity to discuss specific topical issues which may require further action in the future, with an example being how the Hungarian Presidency in 2011 organised its meeting on match-fixing and 'sport-related aspects of online betting'. 46 Second, to facilitate input on topics already set to move forward in the EU in the near future, with an example being how the Cypriot Presidency organised its structured dialogue meeting on the topic of the European Week of Sport. Given the timing of the meeting -just before Council ministerial meetings, rather than at the beginning of a Presidency term -it is clear that structured dialogue has mainly been designed with a focus on debriefing the sports movement of Council outcomes and plans, thus strongly limiting the potential of stakeholders to influence EU sport policy in this mechanism. Thus, structured dialogue is decidedly 'top down' in direction. Given the scarce time allocated to these meetings, it may be seen, at best, as an exchange of impression to inform the Council.
Indeed, no actors in EU sport policy are able to point to any concrete actions or results deriving from the mechanism. 48 However, even if the mechanism has since been subject to much criticism from both stakeholders 49 States not concede any particular status to the Olympic Movement in structured dialogue.
The impact of structured dialogue is superficially negligeble. However, it needs to be understood as a initial stage in the policy process. It also needs to be emphasised that consultations and dialague between public authorities and stakeholders takes place in many other settings. This is evident in the next section which explores how the EU has endeavored to develop and disseminate principles of good governance.
EU law and the quest for good governance in sport
The EU has had a longstanding interest in furthering good governance in sport organisations;
as evident in this chapter, the early decisions of the European Courts were essentially and monitor the activities of sport organisations. The EU has also proposed pledge boards on related issues such as gender equality 68 and the organisation of major sport events. 69 In proposing a pledge board for the latter, the Council makes it clear that while pledge boards are voluntary, they still constitute "a light monitoring system". 70 Accordingly, such soft law initiatives need to be understood as the EU not only re-affirming its commitment to supervised autonomy, but a desire to spread normative principles and to enhance its ability to monitor how sport organisations actually govern themselves, based on said normative principles.
As pledge boards are entirely voluntary their impact, if any, would result from peer pressure and public shaming. In other words, pledge boards could, in theory, induce pressure to reform based on a mixture of 'peer accountability' and 'public reputational accountability'; that is, pressure mechanisms that have traditionally not proven particularly effective. 
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed different ways in which European Union sports law and policy has transformed or helped to transform the governance structures of European sport. From a systemic governance perspective, the most visible consequence is the weakening of the traditional pyramid of governance in European sport, the so-called European Model of Sport.
The result is a much more horizontal network structured of stakeholders where power and authority is shared and diffused. Whereas this is true as a generic analysis, the intensity of these transformations is highly variable from sport to sport. Furthermore, it is fair to affirm that governing bodies still remain very central to European sport governance, even if their power has been eroded.
It is now more than 20 years after the well-known Bosman judgment, but it is clear that legal It could be argued that the European Union has lacked the political will to enforce more direct regulation of sport governance structures in the continent. It is equally true that EU sports law has provided stakeholders with an opportunity that was not present before. What is clear is that the intervention of the European Union, both legally and politically has controlled the behaviour of sport governing bodies to a level that no other public institution has been able to achieve to date.
